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The problem of the in ternal debt in Mexico, like so m any others 
which would plague the independent Republic, began life as yet 
another legacy from the colonial past. Indeed, the d isin tegra­
tion of the Spanish fiscal system in New Spain began in the 
early 1780s (TePaske 1989: 65-67). Yet, a t the same time, tax 
collections were a t an all tim e high and the colonial fiscal sys­
tem  appeared to be functioning extremely well.
The gap between income and expenses increased because of 
additional expenditures for w ar and defense, including pay­
m ents for situados, allotm ents for the m ilitary and navy in the 
Philippines, allocations for new charitable funds, and monies 
ordered to be rem itted  to Spain (TePaske 1983: 76-82).
By 1810 accum ulated debts had risen to 31,000,000 pesos, of 
which obliaations to clerical and lay institu tions totalled
18,500,000 pesos, and loans, presum ably to individuals, 
am ounted to a mere 8,500,000 pesos. In addition, the Real H a­
cienda had  borrowed 16,000,000 pesos from funds which had 
accumulated in the Treasury for indulgences (bulas de santa  
cruzada) and tithes, and had completely depleted these coffers 
by 1798. Royal officials wrote off this debt by declaring retro ­
actively those two ramos ajenos part of the Real Hacienda 
(TePaske 1989: 67).
By 1810, w ith the debt burden rising again, royal agents ap­
propriated the revenues housed as depósitos, bonds and guaran ­
tees as well as the earnings generated by the properties seized
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from the Jesu it Order (temporalidades). Yet during 1809, the 
previous year, the central Treasury of Mexico City collected 
more than  28,000,000 pesos, the largest am ount in its history.
Beginning in 1810 revenue fell off abruptly. Collections 
dropped almost 70 percent from 1809 to 1817 by which time re ­
m ittances to the Treasury had declined to levels equal to those 
of the late 1770s (TePaske 1989: 67). During the period from 
1811 to 1817 paym ents from subsidiary regional treasuries 
throughout the viceroyalty totalled only 1,900,000 pesos, an 
average of 318,000 pesos annually in comparison to an average 
of 5,800,000 pesos per year garnered during the period from 
1795 to 1810.
The decline reflected regional determ ination to keep the ir re­
sources a t home ra th e r than  transport them  to the capital as 
well as a shift in the center of "political" and m ilitary activity. In 
Zacatecas before the Independence W ars arm y costs averaged 
less th an  one percent of total revenue, by 1817 they totalled al­
most 30 percent. The increase in expenses, coupled w ith the 
collapse of silver production which dropped almost two-thirds 
from 1811 to 1821, led to substantial losses in revenue.
Although the central T reasury office in Mexico City was adept 
a t designing new imposts including a real estate and a gradu­
ated income tax, collections could not keep up w ith booming 
m ilitary expenses, which at the ir height in 1812 came to
3.000.000 pesos. And for every recorded m ilitary cost, there 
were additional sums which w ent into the pockets of the offi­
cers in command of any given area (Archer 1993: 28-30).
By the end of 1816 the Real Hacienda in Mexico City owed 
approxim ately 81,000,000 pesos, of which 24,000,000 pesos (30 
percent) represented overdue paym ents to the situados. The 
official who made the estim ate speculated th a t the Crown could 
write off or default on almost 49,000,000 pesos, leaving ju s t
32.000.000 pesos to be repaid (TePaske 1989: 72-73).
It is w ith these 32,000,000 pesos th a t the story of the in ternal 
debt in Mexico begins, although no contemporary historian  or 
even any Treasury official a t the time could have given a precise
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figure as to the total am ount owed. When Agustín de Iturbide 
took power in Mexico in 1821, he tried to retain  creole and pen­
insular support by pledging to honor the debts outstanding 
from pre-independence loans to the Spanish Crown. In  Octo­
ber, less than  one m onth after his trium phal entrance into Mex­
ico City, he established a Ju n ta  de Crédito Público to examine 
the problem of the debt (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1822: 9).
Not surprisingly the new regime soon had debts of its own 
with which to contend. By January  1822 the government au ­
thorized Iturbide to borrow 1,500,000 pesos. On January  9, 
1822, he asked the bishops of G uadalajara, Durango, and 
Oaxaca for 750,000 pesos, to be repaid w ithin six months. 
When T reasury M inister Rafael Pérez Maldonado presented 
the first Memoria de Hacienda for the independent nation, he 
noted th a t the Treasury would run a deficit of 1,921,973 pesos 
for the ten m onths from September 1821 to June 30, 1822. Nev­
ertheless, he believed th a t the colonial tax system would soon 
re tu rn  to its former glory and would yield substan tial sum s.1
In Ju ly  4, 1822, the government ordered the expropriation of 
the "monies destined for Philippine missions" and by October 
1822 the fiscal situation had grown so desperate th a t Iturbide 
was forced to seize a conducta carrying silver w orth 1,200,000 
pesos belonging to m erchants in Perote. Although he justified 
his "expropriation" by correctly noting "there were no funds to 
pay the arm y or government employees, the Treasury was 
empty, money couldn't be borrowed in the country and the for­
eign loans needed more time," (Zavala 1949: 196; all tran s la ­
tions from the Spanish by BAT), Iturbide's bold action became 
ju s t another in a long list of abuses which would be cited to ju s­
tify his overthrow. The costs of the seizure of the conducta and 
the debts owed to the Philippine missions would become two of
1 Modern historians would probably benefit greatly from an opportunity to examine 
the  sources Pérez Maldonado used for some of his calculations. For example, TePaske 
and Hernández Palomo (1976: 1803-1812) indicate th a t the  card monopoly averaged 
145,968.4 pesos in those years, and the gunpowder estanco yielded an  average of 
84,078.2 pesos for 1804-09 (exclusive of 1807, for which there  are no figures). No 
am ounts are recorded for the proceeds of the tobacco monopoly during the period 
(Memoria de Hacienda, México 1822: 14).
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the first item s in the soon-to-be-created post-independence in ­
ternal debt.
The governm ent was well aware th a t this new category of in­
ternal debt was another patch of financial quicksand, bu t it 
had no choice. As Treasury M inister Antonio M edina noted in 
his calculation of income and expenses,
in all these [expense] categories I include th a t of the forced loan of 
1823,... [using it] to pay religiously the sum received in the last 
forced loan...being indispensable for the reestablishm ent of confi­
dence and of bills of exchange th a t the government fulfills sacred­
ly w hat it stipulates (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1870: 72).
During the last months of Iturbide's reign the Treasury 
em itted 4,000,000 pesos in paper money. On April 11, 1823, his 
successors ordered the paper money stopped, the bills in cir­
culation collected and other notes issued in their stead which 
could be used to pay up to 17 percent of the value of in ternal 
trade taxes (Medina 1823: 31-32).
A few m onths la ter Congress authorized a twenty-five to th ir­
ty million peso foreign loan using the entire national Treasury 
for collateral. After the fall of Iturbide his successors also con­
cerned them selves w ith the thorny problem of the impossibility 
of repaying an in ternal debt by which they hoped to m aintain 
precious creole and peninsular support. On September 3, 1823, 
former T reasury M inister Medina reported th a t the nation 
owed 76,286,499 pesos, which included 9,765,799 pesos in back 
in terest (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1823: 25-26).
On November 12 his successor, Francisco de Arrillaga, reject­
ed th a t calculation claiming th a t 26,915,756 pesos did not have 
to be repaid and thereby reduced the overall figure of total pre- 
and post-independence indebtedness to 44,714,563 pesos. In an 
attem pt to reassure future potential creditors, A rrillaga stated  
somewhat disingeniously th a t Mexico's in ternal debt was very 
small in comparison w ith th a t of Spain and of the United 
States (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1870: 74).
In the m eantim e the loans derived from the sale of bonds by 
B ritish m erchant houses finally arrived in 1824 and 1825, a l­
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though much too late to save Iturbide, who had abdicated on 
M arch 19, 1823. As Rodriguez and others have shown, the first 
loan negotiated by Francisco de Borja Migoni contained the 
w orst term s ever granted to a Latin American nation. The sec­
ond was obtained on much better term s (Rodriguez O. 1989: 
222-228).
The Mexican government borrowed the funds w ith the ra th ­
er reasonable expectation th a t they would supplem ent T reasury 
collections until the colonial fiscal system as altered by Iturbide 
would begin to function once more. Unhappily, the fiscal appa­
ra tu s was in much worse shape than  anyone suspected a t the 
time and the government soon became dependent on revenues 
derived from taxes on foreign trade. But while the money from 
the two loans lasted, in ternal borrowing was kept to an absolute 
minimum.
When the speculation bubble bu rst in England in 1825-26 
and the Mexican m arket for B ritish goods had been fairly sa tu ­
rated, ta riff revenues declined by over two million pesos. The 
drop in total revenue forced the Mexican government in August 
1826 to default on its in terest paym ents to B ritish bond­
holders, ru in ing its credit in the European capital m arkets.2
The government now had to find additional funds internally. 
I t sanctioned an old form of lending, or ra th e r an expansion of 
the pre-independence loans to the Crown. But w hereas the 
purveyors of those funds had asked for little or no interest, the 
new suppliers of money, known in Mexico as agiotistas, expected 
satisfactory (some would say "exorbitant") ra tes for risking their 
money in loans to a government which had ju s t defaulted on 
paym ents to m erchant houses located in the greatest power of 
the world.
The rem ainder of this chapter will describe two parallel pro­
cesses. Firstly, it will examine how the Mexican government 
created the various categories of the post-independence inter-
2 W hen Guadalupe Victoria instructed the  T reasury M inister to renegotiate the  B ritish 
debt, Alexander Baring of Baring Brothers advised th a t Mexico first a lter its fiscal 
system substantively before it promised to honor commitments previously broken 
(Rodríguez O. 1975: 127).
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nal debt. Secondly, it will portray the evolution of a "money 
m arket" in Mexico through which its sole customer -  the Mexi­
can national Treasury -  procured from 1827 until 1856 enough 
funds to pay its most pressing obligations. In effect, w hat will 
be described here are not only "banqueros sin bancos," bu t "fi­
nancieros sin dinero."
1. L iv in g  from  d eb t to  d eb t
On July  28, 1824, the nation recognized all debts contracted by 
the viceregal government until September 17, 1810, all debts 
approved between September 17, 1810, and Septem ber 27, 1821, 
and owed to Mexicans, all debts contracted by independent mil­
itary  leaders from the time when the P lan of Iguala was issued 
until Septem ber 28, and all those contracted by the government 
established since the Plan of Iguala (Memoria de Hacienda, 
México 1870: 78). The newly recognized debts became four cat­
egories of the eventual seventeen included in the Law of Public 
Credit of November 30, 1850 which "settled" the in ternal debt. 
The following section will describe the evolution and ac­
cum ulation of the rem ainder.
In his Memoria de Hacienda (1831) Treasury M inister Rafael 
Mangino subm itted the first official accounting of the in ternal 
debt. He calculated it at 28,956,167 pesos, including owed in ­
te rest (Payno y Flores 1866: 12-13). However, as Appendix A 
indicates, th a t sum  only included credits originating from the 
colonial period. The government soon created a new in ternal 
debt as its needs for additional funds increased and its capacity 
to repay new loans dim inished proportionally. On December 2, 
1829, the government contracted to borrow 1,280,000 pesos, 
which was increased to 10,000,000 pesos on M arch 4 of the fol­
lowing year. Six m onths la ter it agreed to pay five percent 
monthly in terest which would compound to no more th an  a 
total of fifteen percent per annum  {Memoria de Hacienda, 
México 1870: 103-104).
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Once in ternal borrowing had started  in Mexico, it quickly be­
came a way of life as governments were forced to borrow in ever 
larger am ounts. When regimes tried  to repay previous loans by 
setting aside one sixth of customs revenues a t Veracruz and 
Tampico to pay foreign bondholders, sequestering an addition­
al one-sixteenth share of total customs revenues and part of 
collections from tolls for in ternal obligations, and perm itting 
certain moneylenders to receive repaym ent directly a t the ports, 
revenues dim inished proportionally (Memoria de Hacienda, 
México 1831: 13-14).
The resu lt was inevitable. On January  1, 1832, the govern­
m ent abruptly stopped paym ent on all debts and ordered them  
registered (Tenenbaum 1986b: 58). Nevertheless, borrowing con­
tinued virtually  unabated. In February 1832 a new government 
recognized the first five million pesos' worth of contracts signed 
in anticipation of customs revenues. It agreed to pay them  from 
funds collected from 40 percent of the customs set aside for 
th a t purpose and also perm itted paym ents on dem and from the 
customs, m ints, and the Mexico City Treasury. As for the rest 
of the eight million additional debt, it would be amortized a t 
two percent a month while credits included in the first five m il­
lion would earn  three percent (Memoria de Hacienda, México 
1833: 11-12).
Yet even as it devised elaborate schemes to repay the in ter­
nal debt still outstanding, the government found itself issuing 
decrees to authorize new borrowings. The most in teresting of 
these laws appeared on August 11, 1832, and stated  th a t the 
government agreed to recognize credits as part of a 4,000,000 
pesos loan. I t further elaborated its preference for pension cer­
tificates, back salary paper and paper from the Montepío which 
would count as cash in making up the loan. By 1833 th a t too, 
had broken down. On April 27 and May 9 the governm ent de­
clared th a t it was stopping paym ent on the credits which paid 
two and three percent monthly interest. The Treasury changed 
the law on Ju ly  12 to perm it those credits to pay up to 20 per­
cent of the im port tax as long as the other 80 percent was paid
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in cash. By December 12 the government allowed all obliga­
tions contracted by its predecessor to be used a t the custom­
houses except th a t of Veracruz, which would only pay 50 per­
cent of face value; the other 50 percent to be used a t the rest of 
the aduanas.
The agiotistas were dissatisfied w ith th a t arrangem ent and 
so the government agreed "to arrange [a settlem ent]...in a way 
which will reconcile [creditors'] in terests w ith the needs of the 
Treasury" (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1870: 130). But des­
pite all attem pts to devise more satisfactory solutions, debt 
paym ents began to require too much revenue. Therefore, on 
November 18, 1834, the new Santa Anna government ordered 
all paym ents to be stopped.
W hat followed was necessary but quite unprecedented, and 
had an enormous im pact on the creation of the in ternal debt as 
well as on the history of moneylending in Mexico. On M arch 2, 
1835, the government proposed to issue new titles for paper re­
sulting from contracts made between January  1, 1832, and No­
vember 18, 1834. These titles would come in four classes of 
"vales de amortización." For example, for credits from "first 
class, the debts would be repaid 30 % in vales and 70 % in cash, 
18 % in credits and 82 % in cash for second" and so on. The law 
would not affect contracts made after November 18, 1834.
In addition, the government also issued vales de alcances 
which included all debts from January  1832 onwards owed to 
public officials, civilian employees, m ilitary officers, retirees 
and pensioners. These were to be exchanged a t face value. U n­
der the term s of the law the government could continue ac­
cepting loans, bu t only those comprised of these two groups of 
vales and cash (Dublán y Lozano 1876-1912,111: 25-28). N atu ­
rally, the regime was unable to fulfill the provisions of th is key 
law. For example, on April 10, 1835, ju s t five weeks after its 
enactm ent, a new decree perm itted the government to make 
deals mortgaging the customs duties as in the good old days, 
w ithout having to use either type of vale.
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Nevertheless, the law was very im portant for two reasons. 
Firstly, it set a precedent th a t the government could arbitrarily  
stop paym ent on its domestic debts, a fact th a t most lenders 
chose to ignore. Secondly, the authorization created new types 
of debt. Obligations owed to government adm inistrators and 
pensioners of all sorts were now officially transform ed into debts 
which might or might not be paid. U ltim ately the law created 
three new categories of post-independence in ternal debt -  "debt 
owed to civil servants," "debt from loans made only in cash," 
"debt from loans made with the admission of credits." As Ap­
pendix C indicates, they considerably increased the to tal a- 
m ount of the in ternal debt.3 Finally, and perhaps most im por­
tantly, the law created an informal type of paper money in Mexi­
co, consisting of considerably devalued debt credits.
The m ilitary strife which characterized the centralist years 
from 1835 to 1847 inevitably created more in ternal debt. The 
process began on November 5, 1835, when the government 
authorized a new 1,000,000 pesos loan in cash, w ith the silver 
mines of Fresnillo as collateral (Memoria de Hacienda, México 
1870: 153).
By June  16, 1836, during the w ar w ith Texas, the government 
ordered a 2,000,000 pesos forced loan in exchange for which 
the lenders received certificates good for the paym ent of their 
taxes in the following year. That was the first tim e since 1823 
th a t debt certificates could officially act as money outside the 
ports (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1870: 155).
On Jan u ary  17, 1837, the government established a bank to 
amortize the copper coins then in circulation which had depre­
ciated substantially  and were subject to easy counterfeiting. 
The decree authorized the new national bank to redeem  the 
coins a t face value from funds to be derived from all the national
3 Although we cannot trace the m onetary growth of the categories of th e  in ternal debt, 
the am ount owed to government employees alone was estim ated a t 25,000,000 pesos 
in 1848. The o ther two groups -  "debt from loans made only in cash," and "debt from 
loans made w ith the  admission of credits" -  would u ltim ately be included in "26 Per­
cent Fund" credits. These would derive from loans made from 1835-1848, which in ­
cluded those credits sanctioned by the  1834 law.
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properties in the Republic, all government revenues, except cus­
toms receipts, proceeds of the tobacco monopoly, the collections 
of the direct taxes on ru ra l and urban  property in Mexico, Pueb­
la, G uanajuato, Michoacán, and Jalisco, the profits from the 
mines of Fresnillo and any other revenues available. On 
April 18, 1837, the government also gave the bank the proper­
ties of the ex-Jesuits and the Inquisition and the back in terest 
dating from June  30 of the previous year from the collection of 
tolls (Dublán y Lozano 1876- 1912,111: 260-265, 459, 535, 591- 
92, 662-63; IV: 24-25, 62-66).
On Septem ber 22, 1838, the government authorized the bank 
to issue credit certificates for a two m onths period totalling
200,000 pesos in shares of 1,000 pesos in cash or in bills for two 
months. This was to cover the arbitrio extraordinario which 
had been decreed on June 8 to help to provide for the indem ni­
ty which derived from the Pastry  W ar (Memoria de Hacienda, 
México 1870: 183). Since it had created the bank, the Treasury 
had used it to negotiate loans, issue bonds, manage the tobacco 
monopoly, and redeem copper coins. On January  10, 1839, it 
authorized the bank to collect the head tax  established on De­
cember 10 of the previous year (Memoria de Hacienda, México 
1870: 195).
The government then decreed on February 16, 1839, th a t the 
bank would receive the proceeds of the two percent tax  on the 
entrance of money a t the ports in exchange for handling the 
accounts for the Contaduría Mayor located there. Two days 
la ter the bank received authorization to contract a loan from 
the regular and secular clergy of the archbishopric of Mexico, 
which was to be guaranteed by the proceeds of the m int in 
Mexico City, funds collected in the departm ent of Mexico, the 
three percent tax  on gold and silver, and the sa lt flats of Peñón 
Blanco (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1870: 196).
On October 21 the T reasury en trusted  the bank w ith the task  
of raising yet another 800,000 pesos and to use th a t sum  to­
gether w ith the proceeds from the tobacco monopoly to repay
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creditors and provide the second installm ent of the sum due to 
the French as part of the settlem ent of the "Pastry War."
On Ju ly  1, 1841, the government ordered the national bank to 
amortize w ithin the next eighteen m onths all the copper coins 
th a t circulated in the country. It issued 8,000,000 pesos in credit 
bonds guaranteed by the "Fifteen Percent Fund" and the "Eight 
Percent Fund" of the customs. It also authorized the bank to 
m int 500,000 pesos in coins to replace those th a t were to be 
w ithdraw n (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1870: 214). Those 
bonds became, of course, another category in the in ternal debt, 
as did those bond paym ents to the holders of the tobacco monop­
oly and to the tobacco growers when on November 12, 1841, the 
new government under Santa Anna once more decided to take 
it over (Walker 1984: 675-705). These two m easures increased 
the num ber of categories of the post-independence in ternal debt 
to eight.
On November 24, 1841, the new government ordered new 
copper coins to be minted on but two weeks later, on December 
6, 1841, it closed the bank of am ortization. Its rem aining funds 
were to be tu rned  over to a new section of the Treasury, '"Active 
credits,1 am ortization of copper coins, and Jesu it properties," 
which was to continue the redem ption process already under­
way (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1870: 217).
On April 20, 1843, the Treasury decided to obtain the
2,500,000 pesos indem nity owed to citizens of the U nited States 
for property damages (as agreed in the convention of April 11, 
1839) by decreeing a forced loan on the treasuries of all depart­
ments. On May 5 it divided up the quotas assigning the highest 
amount, 588,000 pesos, to Mexico, and the lowest, 7,000 pesos, 
to Chiapas. These loans were to be repaid w ithin five years 
(Memoria de Hacienda, México 1870: 240).
Such laws were quickly followed by another three pieces of 
legislation which indicated the precarious state  of affairs. On 
May 11 the government once again suspended paym ent of the 
debt. On A ugust 2, 1843, the Treasury declared th a t it was not 
obliged to issue new bonds to replace those lost. And finally, on
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December 9, 1843, the government decreed th a t the value of 
government lands which were neither situated  along the border 
nor frozen as collateral elsewhere could be used to am ortize cop­
per money bonds (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1870: 241, 250).
The various governments which Mexico had between 1844 
and 1847 did not create a new in ternal debt per se. Instead, 
m any devoted their attention in vain to settling outstanding 
obligations.
2. T h e A rt o f  th e  D ea l
Now th a t th is chapter has outlined the evolution of each cate­
gory of the post-independence in ternal debt, it will tu rn  its a t­
tention to how moneylenders used th a t debt to make new loans, 
build, in effect, a m onetary system of sorts and, through the 
growth of a Mexican "money m arket," created even more debt.
Mexicans had always had recourse to credit operations 
through familial connections and loans from the Church. These 
continued after independence, so th a t in regional and local 
areas individuals could borrow funds for agricultural and other 
operations (Greenow 1983). However, in 1827, when national 
governments w ent looking for loans to make up for revenue 
shortfalls, they were the single customer in the m arket for 
short-term  high in terest loans.
At first the lenders included anyone who had access to cash 
either through mining operations or through the import-export 
trade. Peninsulares w ishing to stay  in Mexico during a particu­
larly hispanophobe period had a special incentive to become 
creditors to the government. U ntil Jan u ary  1, 1832, when the 
B ustam ante adm inistration stopped paym ents, on all domestic 
debts and ordered them  to be registered, the loans seemed 
about as risk-free as any financial operation in Mexico in the 
1820s could possibly be.
In November 1834 the government once again stopped pay­
m ent on its in ternal obligations and for the first time asserted
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its right to pay some in preference to others. As we have seen 
in the preceeding section, this action created a new category of 
in ternal debt. It also elim inated from the field all bu t forty or 
so agiotistas who were now to be paid preferentially.
There is much we still do not know about the na tu re  of the 
money m arket these lenders formed. Nevertheless we can say 
th a t the large scale agiotistas slowly evolved into a tightly-knit, 
ra th e r small community of both foreigners and Mexicans. The 
list of major moneylenders (Appendix B) includes Britons like 
Thomas W orrall and Ewen MacKintosh; Frenchm en such as 
Serm ent P. Fort, "Germans" like Guillermo D rusina, P anam a­
nians like M artinez del Rio, Americans like William Forbes, 
and Spaniards like Gregorio Mier y Terán and Cayetano Rubio.
But we should not make too much of the question of national­
ity, for all were united in the pursu it of profit through specula­
tion. The very instability of Mexican governments increased 
profit potentials, because wealthy national and foreign resi­
dents simply continued to refuse to pay taxes. Regardless of the 
long list of reasons they cited for the ir behavior, the results 
were the same -  the government was forced to borrow heavily.
Although we cannot as yet reconstruct the negotiations in ­
volved in a loan transaction, we do know th a t from the very 
beginning, w ith the first major in ternal loan authorized on No­
vember 21, 1827, for 8,000,000 pesos, the government was w ill­
ing to accept credits a t a high percentage of the ir face value as 
p a rt of the loan package. The 8,000,000 pesos of th a t loan were 
to be provided ha lf in cash (4,000,000 pesos) and h a lf in credits 
accepted a t 56 percent of their nominal value (Memoria de H a­
cienda, México 1870: 90).
The term s of th a t first loan are quite indicative. They obvi­
ously represent the successful culmination of previous negotia­
tions w ith those willing to lend. In exchange for a non-interest 
bearing loan to be repaid w ith 100,000 pesos monthly from im ­
port tariffs and 35,000 pesos from the tobacco monopoly, the 
government was prepared to accept credits selling in the open 
m arket for hardly more than  15 percent of their face value (and
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probably much less) a t 56 percent, even when it had the power 
to blackmail w ealthy Spaniards into lending in the first place.4 
Given th a t these were the best term s the Mexican government 
could obtain in a wide-open money m arket, the conditions for 
fu ture loans could only grow worse.
The government's bargaining position weakened over time, 
particularly  since its group of "bankers" was becoming smaller, 
w ealthier, and more experienced. The exam ination of the loan 
term s of the years 1827 to 1847 reveals a picture of govern­
m ental weakness and moneylenders' ascendency, provided his­
torians are willing to ignore two salient factors. In the first 
place, as in the pre-modern period in Europe and in New Spain 
prior to the Bourbon Reforms, private companies controlled by 
moneylenders came to perform many governmental services, 
rented various national resources, and collected taxes for a flat 
fee or a percentage of the total. Presumably, had they not done 
so, governm ents would not have been able to accomplish the re­
quired tasks or would have done so sloppily or interm ittently .
Secondly, by "involving" moneylenders in the ir operations 
and by having the exclusive power to make good on the ir debt 
paper and purchased credits, governments forced the ir creditors 
to have a vested in terest in the Mexican nation and to continue 
to lend them  money even beyond the point of prudence.5 More­
over, we cannot as yet determ ine -  and perhaps never will -  to 
w hat extent governments were "objective" about the ir selection 
of lenders and potential deals. After all, even today negotia­
tions are frequently "sweetened" by bribes, "kickbacks," pro­
mises of m onetary or other favors, access to other deals, or con­
cluded through blackmail, th reats, and extortion.
4 Five days after the introduction of the loan, on November 26, several deputies in­
troduced a bill in Congress calling for the expulsion of all Spanish-born residents 
from Mexico (Reflexiones sobre las leyes de españoles. México: Agustín Guiol 1833, 
quoted in Flores Caballero 1974: 129, 133, n. 74).
5 See Gootenberg (1989b) for a contrary case in Peru. He argues th a t such wild specu­
lation did not happen there  and th a t foreign m erchants shied away from participating 
in governm ental finance. Perhaps we should consider w hether there  were benefits to 
agiotistas in Mexico, which h istorians have yet to determine. Since in th e  days before 
lucrative tax  writeoffs only profitable businesses stayed in operation, i t  is possible th a t 
losses and bankruptcies have been greatly exaggerated for reasons still unknown.
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Lending proceeded very smoothly for the agiotistas, both big 
and small, from the first loan on November 21, 1827, until J a n ­
uary 1, 1832. On December 24, 1827, the government agreed to 
accept credits a t more than  60 percent of the ir face value. Soon 
after the government had officially to prohibit loans containing 
less than  20 percent in cash. In one typical transaction reported 
by Treasury M inister Rafael Mangino in 1830, the government 
paid 941,164 pesos from customs revenues in re tu rn  for a loan 
of 216,556 pesos in cash (23 percent) and the res t in credits. 
This m eant a re tu rn  to the agiotistas of 289 percent on the ir in ­
vestm ent, assum ing th a t the credits had been purchased a t the 
overly generous figure of 15 percent of their face value (Memo­
ria de Hacienda, México 1870: 109).
Initially the government of Anastasio B ustam ante and Lucas 
Alamán was very favorably disposed toward the moneylenders 
and borrowed over 6,000,000 pesos, so as not to have to impose 
new taxes (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1832: 10-11; M emo­
ria de Hacienda, México 1833: charts 12 and 13). On Ja n u ­
ary 1, 1832, however, it suspended paym ent on all loans. This 
government fell on August 14.
Its successors, Antonio López de Santa Anna and Valentin 
Gómez Farias, were well aware th a t the debts which Alamán 
and B ustam ante had accumulated were bankrupting the T rea­
sury. N evertheless, they continued to borrow hoping th a t 
Gómez Farias would succeed in enacting his plan to impose the 
sale of Church property and give the government a new sales 
tax  to help fill its coffers. As is well known, the ir plans did not 
succeed and San ta Anna was forced to re tu rn  to the presidency 
on April 24,1834, as the leader of a clerical-sponsored reaction.
On November 26, 1834, the government stopped all paym ents 
to its creditors and eventually gave them  vales instead of cash. 
This m easure reduced the num ber of lenders and also created 
new types of debt paper to be used in putting  loans together. 
However, expenses skyrocketed as the political situation 
worsened because of the imposition of "centralism," forcing the 
national arm y to put down a revolt in Zacatecas and to lose 
control of Texas.
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On April 10, 1835, the government specified th a t all loans in 
the fu ture had  to contain a t least 55 percent in cash. Few mon­
eylenders, however, w anted to negotiate under such onerous 
term s given the suspension of paym ents the previous year.
Therefore, the government was forced to redistribute its 
w ealth to its  lenders in order to re-borrow the money from them. 
On Jan u ary  20, 1836, the Treasury created the "Fifteen Percent 
Fund" by pledging 15 percent of its income from the customs to 
pay "all the orders issued by the government on loans, on con­
tracts, and those of the vales de amortización.'' At first the 
Treasury hoped to give the agiotistas 15 percent in cash and 
the rest in vales, bu t by September 15, 1836, it had pledged re­
paym ent w ith 85 percent in cash and 15 percent in vales, term s 
far better th an  those they had ever received before. In contrast, 
holders of other in ternal debt credits were rarely  given even 
five percent of customs revenue. In fact, the creditors of the 
"Fifteen Percent Fund" received almost as much as the British 
bondholders who were legally entitled to 16 2h  percent of the 
receipts from Veracruz and Tampico.6
The creation of the "Fifteen Percent Fund" calmed and re ­
plenished the money m arket and borrowing greatly increased 
in the crisis years of 1836 and 1837. At the same tim e the agio­
tistas forced the Treasury to make even more concessions, thus 
expanding the ancillary benefits of lending. For example, as 
early as 1834 the government contracted w ith M anuel Escan- 
dón's stagecoach company to m aintain  key roads and collect 
tolls on those so designated. The new arrangem ent suspended 
the liens on such tolls which had been held by prom inent mem­
bers of the former colonial Consulado, such as Bassoco, Fagoaga, 
and V illaurru tia for 15 years. In 1835 the company received for
100,000 pesos a five-year contract to carry mail on the ir routes. 
Similarly, in exchange for a 1,000,000 pesos loan from the agio-
6 P rior to Jan u a ry  1836, the  creditors holding pre- and post-independence paper were 
awarded one-sixteenth (la media octava parte) of the customs and toll collections. In 
the  boom year of 1830-31, when customs duties reached 8,483,006 pesos, creditors of 
the  in te rnal debt received 435,930 pesos or five percent (Memoria de Hacienda, Méxi­
co 1870: 108, 154).
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tistas, the government mortgaged one-half of the proceeds from 
the Fresnillo silver mines in 1835 and agreed not to raise its 
taxes for twelve years. Shortly after, Ewen C. MacKintosh 
m anaged to get licenses to export unm inted bullion w ithout 
having to procure additional governmental permissions. Soon 
after he began to ren t m ints from the government (Urias Her- 
mosillo 1978: 38-42; Randall 1972: 194-195).
D uring the second Presidency of Anastasio B ustam ante 
(April 19, 1837, to January  23, 1839; July  19, 1839, to Septem ­
ber 22, 1841), some of the moneylenders enjoyed a golden age. 
For example, soon after B ustam ante had established the na­
tional bank mentioned above to amortize the rapidly deval­
uating  copper coins in circulation, it let the tobacco monopoly 
to a private consortium of moneylenders which included Benito 
Maqua, Cayetano and Francisco Rubio, Felipe Neri del Barrio, 
Miguel Bringas, and M anuel Escandón.
In the m eantim e the "Fifteen Percent Fund" had launched a 
new type of speculation in credits. Since the holders of the pa­
per to be redeemed by th a t Fund were to receive 15 percent of 
the customs revenues, the selling price of those particu lar fi­
nancial instrum ents rose to 80 percent of the ir face value in 
comparison to pre-independence debt paper, which continued 
to sell for a mere 8 percent in the m arketplace, and post-inde­
pendence debt, which sold for 14 percent {Memoria de Hacienda, 
México 1840: 130). Consequently when the governm ent repaid 
the group of debts included in the "Fifteen Percent Fund" w ith­
in three years, the prestam istas  earned large profits.
On May 20, 1837, the regime institu ted  another such Fund, 
this time for 17 percent, w ith a principal of 2,534,020 pesos, 
w ith sim ilar profitable results for the moneylenders. When the 
government repaid these Funds, the moneylenders grew richer, 
manifestly a t the expense of the Treasury. This served to 
weaken the adm inistration still further and forced it to borrow 
even more. On the other hand, the large profits derived from 
the Funds made agiotistas more than  happy to participate in 
such arrangem ent in the future.
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In his Memoria de Hacienda (1840), Treasury M inister F ran ­
cisco Lombardo, an agiotista himself, explained some of the 
wheeling and dealing of the Treasury and the Mexican money 
m arket. Lombardo was a longtime friend of then  interim  
President Antonio López de Santa Anna, who had defended the 
country against the French, emerged a hero, and served as 
President from M arch 20, 1839, to July  10, 1839.
According to Lombardo, the relationship between the gov­
ernm ent and its agiotistas altered during the French blockade 
of Veracruz which lasted from April 16, 1838, until March 9, 
1839, only a few days before Santa Anna officially took office. 
D uring th a t period the Treasury was operating w ithout cash 
flows from its major port and found itself in a daily struggle to 
find enough money to carry out even the most m inimal of its 
responsibilities. The situation actually worsened w ith the lift­
ing of the blockade, since the Mexican government then  had to 
find th ree installm ents of 200,000 pesos in cash to pay the in­
dem nity owed to the French.
On December 5, 1838, the government, in desperation issued 
a decree, which perm itted it to do w hatever was necessary to 
procure enough funds to survive. Such a law inevitably led to a 
series of ruinous contracts between a bankrupt Treasury and 
its lenders. On March 7, 1839, ju s t as the blockade was about 
to be lifted and San ta Anna to assum e office, the government 
rescinded the earlier decree. However, as Lombardo discovered 
on May 21, his th ird  day in office, the Treasury did not receive 
the new law halting the wholesale issuing of contracts to the 
agiotistas un til May 21, which perm itted its officials to make 
even more nefarious deals by claiming th a t the old law was 
still in effect (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1840: 27-29).
During the interregnum  period from M arch 20, 1839, to 
May 17, 1839, Treasury M inister José Gómez de la Cortina ap­
proved over 2,000,000 pesos in debt contracts. We have some 
examples of the loans made during this controversial in terreg­
num  period. For example, in M arch 1839 the government bor­
rowed 140,000 pesos in credits and 22,150 pesos in cash from
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Francisco M aria Iturbe, Antonio Garay, Antonio Zurutuza, and 
Hube and Company for six months in exchange for 120,150 
pesos in le tters paid from the im port duties (worth 58 and 68 
percent of the duties levied) and 42,000 pesos in le tters on du­
ties on the export of silver. This loan contained 86 percent in 
credits (purchased a t 15 percent of their face value) and only 
14 percent in cash, the lowest proportion of cash in any loan 
yet seen. Assuming th a t the percentages were adhered to, the 
agiotistas presum ably earned a whopping 376 percent profit 
(Meyer Cosío 1986: 105).
Also in March 1839 another group of agiotistas, including 
M artinez del Rio, Geaves and almost all the English houses, 
formed together w ith the Echeverrias a consortium in order to 
lend 50,000 pesos per week to a maximum of 1,350,000 pesos, 
promising to deliver pre-independence credits and vales de 
alcance in exchange for one percent per month in terest on the 
cash in libranzas from Veracruz (Walker 1986: 295-298).
When Lombardo entered the M inistry he had to decide on 
the legitimacy of the contracts made by his predecessor. His 
resolution of the crisis dem onstrated the interdependence be­
tween the agiotistas and the Treasury because he upheld every 
one of the loans ra th e r than  risk alienating the government's 
sole reliable source of revenue. His decision was fu rther moti­
vated by the fact that, as usual, the Treasury was virtually  
empty on the day he was sworn into office.
Lombardo's report is a steady refrain of the daily procure­
m ent of a few thousand pesos here, another 600 pesos there to 
pay specific urgent expenses. At first, those capable of lending 
large sums refused to oblige because of the provisions of the 
new law, except for Gregorio Mier y Terán, who lent 15,000 pe­
sos "without interest." Not suprisingly, when Lombardo sug­
gested th a t the holders of Fund paper agree to new term s, the 
speculators let out a howl of protest.
A consortium of investors offered to lend the governm ent all 
th a t it needed in devalued copper coins if it agreed to reim ­
burse them  w ith silver either from the Mexico City customs or
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from w hatever port the government decided to designate. Ac­
cording to Lombardo, San ta  Anna him self tu rned  the project 
down, claiming it to be too favorable to the agiotistas. In  the 
m eantim e Lombardo continued to accept non-interest paying 
loans from M ier y Terán, Cayetano Rubio, Agüero, Carrera, 
Rosas, D rusina, Echeverría and others. He even mentioned 
th a t San ta  A nna him self lent 25,000 pesos of his own funds.
N aturally, the Treasury M inister appreciated these "favors" 
and was quick to defend the generosity of the lenders, "who 
have the fidelity of a banker," and in exchange awarded them  
letters from the "Seventeen Percent Fund."7 However, due to 
the creation of so m any funds, Lombardo was reduced to 
working w ith a mere 56 percent of the customs receipts, of 
which 764,274 pesos was also pledged to creditors (Memoria de 
Hacienda, México 1840: 33-34, 41-46, 50).
Table 1 : Credits Repaid from May 18 -  June  7, 1839 (in Pesos)
Fund Name Amount R epresentative
Fifteen 96,771 G. M ier y Terán
Seventeen 110,882 J. Rondero
Twelve 73,424 Agüero, González
Customs 659,156
Total 940,233 (5.4%)
1839 income 17,545,191 (100%)
Source: Memoria de Hacienda, México (1840: 52).
The repaym ent of the Funds seriously h u rt the traditionally 
impoverished Treasury. According to Table 1, from May 18 to 
June 7 the Treasury paid 940,233 pesos in obligations incurred 
after the lifting of the French blockade.
7 His defense of agiotaje is quite interesting. For example, he rails against the popular 
confusion of agiotistas w ith  thieves (ladrones) (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1840: 
46).
M exico's M oney M arke t and  th e  In te rn a l Debt, 1821-1855 277
However, Lombardo did modify the term s of one loan con­
tracted during the March-May hiatus. When S an ta A nna need­
ed to borrow 300,000 pesos to pay part of the French indem ­
nity, Lorenzo Carrera, a Spanish agiotista lent him  200,000 
pesos in cash and 100,000 pesos in credits payable a t the 
customs.
These term s threatened  the repaym ent of the 1,350,000 
pesos loan from M artinez del Rio, Geaves, almost all of the B rit­
ish firms and the Echeverrias. Lombardo and the B ritish M in­
ister Pakenham  decided on June 8, 1839, to void the original 
contract, to gran t for 300,000 pesos already paid two percent 
in terest and to create a "Ten Percent Fund" to repay the claims 
due to the group (Walker 1986: 169).
Lombardo left the M inistry on Ju ly  15, 1839, ostensibly be­
cause he was unable to fill the Treasury. Some, however, might 
have added th a t he resigned under a cloud because he had 
approved a loan of 650,000 pesos (£ 130,000) a t 2 XA  percent per 
month from the B ritish agiotista Thomas W orrall, ostensibly 
representing a consortium of foreign lenders. It was probably 
the first such loan generated abroad since the default on the 
foreign debt in 1827. Lombardo pointed out to his critics th a t 
he had brought new money to Mexico while giving foreign 
creditors a stake in the fu ture of the country. He concluded his 
sum m ary defense by noting, "[Mexico] received a [way to] de­
velop those things which it should help forward, because the 
President is unable to procure such a sum  and not use it to sa t­
isfy creditors, to transform  it into one of the funds to which 
they have been assigned." He la ter added th a t given th a t 56 per­
cent of the customs had been unavailable for some time, this 
loan was the first to give the Treasury some funds. According 
to Lombardo, its costs were much lower than  they would have 
been in Mexico since it would be repaid w ith part of the new 
issue of the renegotiated B ritish debt a t m arket rate, which 
was then  hovering a t approxim ately 25 percent of face value. 
Consequently, foreign creditors would receive a financial in ­
strum ent "worth" £ 400 for a Mexican expenditure of a mere
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£100 a t five percent annual in terest (Memoria de Hacienda, 
México 1840: 91-95).
The brouhaha over this loan and the renegotiation of the 
"Ten Percent Fund" m arks the beginning of the end of the "gold­
en age" of moneylending and shows how the Mexican money 
m arket was growing increasingly anxious about the potential 
for repaym ent of its outstanding loans. In effect, the govern­
m ent had finally gained some leverage over its lenders through 
the dubious expedient of im m inent bankruptcy. Simply put, 
the money m arket divided into factions as each tried  to guar­
antee its  share of w hatever spoils still remained.
W hen B ustam ante retu rned  to the Presidency on Ju ly  19, 
1839, he appointed Francisco Javier Echeverría, another agio­
tista, as Treasury M inister. Echeverría was highly responsive 
to the wishes of his fellow moneylenders and the B ritish Min­
ister Pakenham , but he also sought to get som ething from 
them  in return . B ustam ante and Echeverría paid the ir credi­
tors scrupulously, bu t they dem anded th a t the agiotistas con­
tribu te  a refacción (premium) in order to receive the ir money. 
W hen the B ritish M inister protested against the governmental 
order th a t creditors pay such a sum, Echeverría offered him 
two choices. The lenders could pay a 35 % prem ium  in cash on
2,500,000 pesos (875,000 pesos) to get their credits recognized 
at 56 % of face value (1,400,000 pesos) or pay a 10 % premium 
(250,000 pesos) to continue the "Ten Percent Fund." The m er­
chants decided to let the new credits enter the Fund in ex­
change for the right to all the consumo tax  collected from B rit­
ish m erchants resident in Mexico City. The government, for its 
part, printed and m arketed new "Ten Percent Fund" credits on 
September 1840.
Almost simultaneously, the government created in 1839 the 
"Eight Percent Fund." During his previous adm inistration San­
ta  A nna had agreed to use 12 percent of the customs to handle 
credits w orth 2,200,000 pesos w ith a monthly in terest ra te  of 
up to two percent. In September 1839 the Treasury asked 
these creditors for a 40,000 pesos prem ium  and reduced the 
percentage to eight percent.
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Initially the Funds paid off handsomely. By 1840 the T rea­
sury had repaid both the "the Fifteen Percent" and the "Seven­
teen Percent" Funds w ith interest. As a result, during th a t 
year M artinez del Río Hermanos held 9.8 percent of the firm's 
assets in debt credits, bu t they earned 44.9 percent of the  total 
gross profits for th a t year.
In 1840 after the government had finished repaying the  "Sev­
enteen Percent Fund," various agiotistas were determ ined to 
participate in a new loan with sim ilar repaym ent conditions. 
M artinez del Río Hermanos joined in a consortium w ith Ju an  
Rondero, Montgomery, Nicod and Company, and Antonio Ga­
ray. This group, combined w ith another put together by Ignacio 
Loperena and Francisco Iturbe, agreed to lend the government 
2,000,000 pesos in exchange for the 17 percent of the customs 
duties which had previously been earm arked for the "Seven­
teen Percent Fund" (Walker 1986: 167-171).
These repaym ents severely affected the Treasury. As T rea­
sury M inister Sebastián Canseco noted, in 1840 alone the 
Treasury spent 10,108,733 pesos on "payments of loans, pre­
miums and deposits," or 4.21 pesos for the repaym ent of loans 
for each peso spent on genuine adm inistration costs. This is de­
m onstrated in Table 2.
The agiotistas accepted the new prem ium s as the price for 
doing business in an unstable Mexico. However, the money 
m arket disintegrated further as Treasury revenues rapidly de­
clined and obligations mounted. Some creditors, of course, con­
tinued to be favored. In 1841, the last year of the B ustam ante 
regime, M anuel Escandón and others served as bonding agents 
for customs officials, some of whom were sim ultaneously in 
their employ. Escandón also received a government contract to 
construct the piers, warehouses, and offices for the Veracruz 
customs facilities (Urias Hermosillo 1978: 44).
Nevertheless, by the summer of 1841, the agiotistas began to 
abandon B ustam ante in favor of Santa Anna, ra th e r than  
Paredes or Canalizo. On October 11, 1841, ju s t one day after he 
entered office, San ta  Anna suspended paym ent on all the
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Table 2\ S tatus of 8 Percent, 10 Percent, 15 Percent, 17 Percent 
Funds, Ju ly  1840 (in Pesos)
Fund Principal Amount Amortized
8 Percent 2,200,000 748,000
10 Percent 2,000,000 -
15 Percent 1,600,000 448,0002
17 Percent1 2,500,000 2,150,000
Total 8,300,000 2,150,000
1 Original. 2 192,000 pending.
Source: Pedro Ansoátegui to Gregorio M artinez del Rio, Mexico 
City, Ju ly  6, 1841, Archive of Carlos M artinez del Río y Fernán­
dez de H enestrosa, cited in W alker (1986: 171). The am ortiza­
tion figures were calculated by BAT.
funds. Three days la ter he restored them, but a t ha lf rates. In 
the meantim e, he increased the size of the arm y and the num ­
ber of government workers. He intended to pay these new em­
ployees w ith funds which had been previously spent in sa tis­
fying obligations to government creditors.
Santa Anna suspended paym ents yet again on February 19, 
1842, which precipitated the final breakup of the Mexican 
money m arket as it had existed since 1834. N aturally, the P re­
sident took advantage of the situation and gleefully pitted  one 
moneylender and his faction against another. The foreign-born 
or associated ran  to the ir m inisters, the native Mexicans allied 
themselves w ith lenders who were more powerful.
Finally, on Ju ly  12, 1842, Santa Anna offered to pay holders 
of fund paper a flat 15 percent for a 40,000 pesos premium. 
They refused and he resum ed paym ent only on the second "Fif­
teen Percent Fund," which was owned mostly by his cronies 
Ignacio Loperena and Antonio Garay. On Septem ber 20 he of­
fered the creditors a flat 16 percent paym ent on the rem aining 
funds if they paid a ten  percent premium. They countered by 
proposing to pay 100,000 pesos so th a t the government would
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pay ha lf of the eight, ten  and twelve percent funds. Mont­
gomery, Nicod and Company refused to participate in the hope 
th a t the B ritish M inister Pakenham  would intervene on its be­
half.
Pakenham  won a special convention for the B ritish subjects, 
so th a t claims owned by M anning and M arshall, J. P. Penny 
and Company, and M artinez del Rio would receive two percent 
of the Veracruz customs and one percent from Tampico. He 
also helped Montgomery, Nicod and Company win the repay­
m ent of a 2,200,000 pesos loan in exchange for a six percent 
premium. This settlem ent soon became known as the "Five 
Percent Fund."
On May 11, 1843, however, Santa Anna stopped paym ent yet 
again on the funds and created a special "Twenty-Five Percent 
Fund" to handle all of them  in exchange for another six percent 
premium. He included in this grouping 5,000,000 pesos worth 
of tobacco bonds held by Escandón and his cronies. Paym ents 
on the "Five Percent Fund" were suspended until the middle of 
1844, by which tim e Montgomery, Nicod and Company was 
bankrupt and Nicod reportedly insane (Walker 1986: 176-181).
San ta  Anna, like Bustam ante, was overthrown on Decem­
ber 6, 1844. From th a t December until June 20, 1848, ten  dif­
ferent governments "ruled" Mexico. The chaos and the w ar 
w ith the U nited S tates helped to reconstitute the money m ar­
ket while m aking business conditions all the more difficult as 
each new regime cancelled the loans made by its predecessors.
In 1845 the government transform ed the "Twenty-Five Per­
cent Fund" into the "Twenty-Six Percent Fund." After the Trea­
sury suspended all contracts in May to repay previous loans, it 
assigned them  six percent of the customs duties. The following 
m onth the government decreed th a t owed in terest paym ents 
would not be capitalized except for contracts involving "items 
necessary for the public welfare such as uniforms, arm s, etc." 
Thereafter the speculators hid behind the smoke screen cate­
gory of "necessary items" (Dublán y Lozano 1876-1912,V: 7-8, 
23-25).
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D uring th is time a very small group of agiotistas made consid­
erable profits. The others, however, suffered as paym ents were 
suspended once more on May 2, 1846. In exchange the Trea­
sury announced on June 29 th a t it was beginning to keep count 
of the in ternal debt, the precursor of the "Law of Public Credit," 
proclaimed on November 30, 1850. This law indicated th a t spec­
ulators were running the government during w artim e and tha t 
they w anted to convince those previously forced out of the m ar­
ket to begin lending once more.
3. T h e Im p o ss ib le  D ream  -  T h e L aw  o f  P u b lic  C red it and  
D ip lo m a tic  C o n v en tio n s
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the w ar w ith the 
U nited S tates and brought Mexico an indem nity of 15,000,000 
pesos, to be paid in five yearly installm ents of 3,000,000 pesos 
each. For the first time since the loans of 1824 and 1825, Mex­
ico had some money w ith which to pay its foreign and in ternal 
debts. As a result, the rem aining agiotistas mobilized to mount 
a cam paign for their fair share of the spoils.
I t was to be a hard  fought war, w ith influence and connections 
playing a hidden but crucial role. From the day the new gov­
ernm ent took office in June, it started  repaying some of its cre­
ditors. Its first Treasury M inister, M ariano Riva Palacio, im ­
mediately pledged 791,685 pesos from the first installm ent of 
the indem nity to moneylenders (600,000 pesos to Ewen Mac- 
K intosh and 191,685 pesos to redeem pension credits). How­
ever, when he rented the tobacco monopoly to an agiotista con­
sortium  composed of M anuel Escandón, Miguel Bringas, and 
the B ritish consul Ewen M acKintosh in exchange for 20 per­
cent of its receipts, the other moneylenders and the newspa­
pers created such an uproar th a t Riva Palacio was forced to re­
sign.8
8 Letter from Lucas Alamán to M ariano Riva Palacio, August 26, 1848, in  M ariano Riva 
Palacio Archives, Garcia Collection, Benson L atin  American Collection, University of 
Texas, Austin, no. 2909; Memoria de Hacienda, México (1870: 567).
Mexico's M oney M arket an d  the  In te rn a l D ebt, 1821-1855 283
Before he left office, Riva Palacio issued the first estim ate of 
the size of the in ternal debt since 1831. He stated  th a t Mexico 
owed a to tal of 92,432,670 pesos (Appendix C) of which 
44,524,879 pesos derived from the colonial period and 
47,907,791 pesos from the post-independence years. A brief 
glance a t the categories reveals th a t speculators owned a m ini­
mum of 57,557,791 pesos (62.3 percent) of the outstanding debt.
The next Treasury M inister, M anuel P iña y Cuevas, fuelled 
the controversy even more when he announced his settlem ent 
of the tobacco credits, which allowed for six percent of the 
"Twenty-Six Percent Fund" to go to M artinez del Río H erm a­
nos and other holders of the tobacco bonds together w ith an ad­
ditional 16,000 pesos per m onth from the newly established to­
bacco monopoly. N aturally, the other creditors of the "Twenty- 
Six Percent Fund" were outraged since the new "Six Percent 
Fund" contained recognized credits of 3,500,000 pesos w hereas 
the total of the "Twenty Percent Fund" was 68,000,000 pesos 
and each was to receive six percent of the customs revenues. 
Furtherm ore, while the B ritish M inister him self kept watch 
over paym ents to the creditors of the "Six Percent Fund," pay­
m ents to the "Twenty Percent Fund" could easily be diverted to 
other uses (Payno y Flores 1862: 74-75; El Siglo XIX, México, 
February 8, 1849, p. 3). Such m aneuvers pu t additional p res­
sure on the Treasury to create a workable solution to the in ­
ternal debt once and for all.
Throughout 1849 politicians and editorial w riters proposed 
two types of unworkable solutions to the problem. E ither they 
envisioned spending part of the indem nity for debt paym ents 
or they w anted to use large portions of customs revenue to repay 
creditors. By September 15, 1849, the Congressional Commis­
sion working on the debt had reduced its principal to 47,000,000 
pesos, halved the total of outstanding interest, and lowered the 
in terest ra te  to three percent. In exchange, creditors would 
receive a seven percent bonus for redeeming their credits.
Under th is plan, all credits would be included in the same 
pot, including those previously settled by private arrangem ent.
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For example, tobacco bondholders indemnified a t 88 percent re­
ceived a bond for 88 pesos for every 100 pesos of face value, 
plus an additional 8.80 pesos as compensation for losing ha lf of 
the accrued in terest, and a bonus of 6.73 pesos from the in­
demnity. The law passed the Cham ber of Deputies but failed in 
the Senate.9
The following year Treasury M inister Melchor Ocampo is­
sued his classification of the in ternal debt in which speculators 
dominated a t least ten of the seventeen groups. The credits 
included in three of the categories had already been settled by 
special convention -  those owed to B ritish subjects, Montgom­
ery, Nicod and Company, and the tobacco monopoly -  and had 
already been separated from the rest. In the battle  for repay­
ment, the sides were clearly drawn. Each group was to nam e a 
representative to prepare an accurate list of creditors including 
the ir nam es, owed principal and in terest rate, bu t by Sep­
tem ber 1850 five representatives had refused to come to term s 
w ith the governm ent.10
Finally on November 30, 1850, Treasury M inister Manuel 
Payno y Flores completed the settlem ent package known as the 
Law of Public Credit (Appendix D), which he acknowledged 
was aimed "particularly a t the foreigners who acquired Mexican 
credits a t ruinous prices in order to make them  valuable la ter 
w ith the support and force of their M inisters." The arrange­
m ent called for a common fund of 25,700,000 pesos, 20 percent 
of customs receipts, 3,000,000 pesos yearly am ortization and 
an in terest ra te  of three percent sliding to five percent. The gov­
ernm ent pledged to pay creditors an im m ediate 2,500,000 
pesos for am ortization, the net profits from the reestablished 
tobacco monopoly, and an additional ten  percent from im port 
duties. Payno then issued 40,000,000 pesos in new bonds, set 
up an office in the Treasury M inistry to supervise debt regis­
9 Cámara de Diputados, México (1849: 26-27, 29, 31, 71).
10 They were the  representatives of the  "Six Percent Fund," the  Mining Fund, the  Con­
sulados of both Veracruz and Mexico City, and the  tobacco harvesters. Documentos, 
México (1851: 18-19, 41-42, 46-47, 64-65).
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tration  and liquidation and established a Committee of Public 
Credit w ith the agiotista Gregorio Mier y Terán as president. If 
creditors refused to put the ir paper in the common fund, they 
would not be paid for ten  years.11
The in ternal debt was, however, destined to rem ain unsettled. 
After T reasury M inister Payno resigned on Jan u ary  13, 1851, 
his successor, Veracruz senator José Ignacio Esteva y González 
revealed th a t the Treasury could not fulfill the provisions of 
the law. Payno had believed th a t 2,500,000 pesos would have 
been enough to cover the first installm ent to creditors. However, 
the accounting division soon revised th a t figure to 5,994,869 
pesos, as can be seen in Appendix E. It appeared th a t 4,048,712 
pesos (67.5 percent) of the total was owed to moneylenders, of 
which 2,941,667 pesos had been or would be included in m inis­
terial settlem ents outside the common fund. If Mexico honored 
the new law, it would have to spend all but 280,000 pesos of the 
1851 and 1852 indem nity paym ents (6,540,000 pesos including 
interest) honoring obligations owed to domestic and foreign 
creditors.12
When it became clear th a t the Law of Public Credit would 
bankrupt the Treasury, Foreign M inister José Fernando Ram i­
rez bowed to the constant pressure of the B ritish M inister and 
others and concluded a series of special arrangem ents called 
Diplomatic Conventions to settle claims owed to citizens of 
Spain, B ritain, and France and negotiated by the ir respective 
m inisters. These agreem ents had the force of trea ties and, if 
broken, could resu lt in invasion. Indeed, they were p a rt of the 
rationale for the British, French, and Spanish landings in 
Veracruz in 1861.
Ramirez and the Spanish M inister Ju an  Antonine Zayas 
signed the Spanish Convention on November 14, 1851. The 
first such agreem ent between Spain and Mexico had been 
signed on Ju ly  17, 1847 to settle debts owed to Spanish citizens 
from colonial times. According to the new Convention, the Mexi­
11 Documentos, México (1851: 35, 41-42, 46-47); Ley, México (1850).
12 Esteva (1851: 8-10, 19-21, 85-88, 91); El Siglo X IX  (México, February  27, 1851), p. 4.
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can government pledged to issue bonds totaling 7,500,533 pe­
sos, bearing an in terest ra te  of three percent.13
On December 4, 1851, Ramirez concluded an agreem ent with 
the B ritish M inister, Sir Percy Doyle, in which the Mexican 
government agreed to reserve 12 percent of all im port taxes to 
pay the 1,269,892 pesos owed to the bankrup t B ritish firm 
Montgomery, Nicod and Company and 3,876,434 pesos in to­
bacco credits held by M artinez del Río Hermanos. When he 
learned of the arrangem ent, M anuel Payno y Flores grumbled 
th a t no B ritish squadron would come to dem and th a t Mexico 
pay the two or three dozen widows who daily petitioned for 
pensions, bu t th a t it m ight do so in response to M artinez del 
Rio's complaints (Memoria de Hacienda, México 1870: 374, 
376-377; Payno y Flores 1862: 75-83, 149).
Finally, on Jan u ary  21, 1852, Ramirez concluded the last of 
these agreem ents w ith the French M inister André Levasseur, 
in which Mexico agreed to pay the banking house of Serm ent P. 
Fort one ha lf of the proceeds of the tax  on the in ternal circula­
tion of money and all of the taxes on the export of silver from 
Veracruz and Tampico. They also consented to pay the m er­
chant house D rusina and Company 109,143 pesos from the im ­
port taxes collected a t the Pacific ports. In all, Ramirez m an­
aged to add 14,000,000 pesos in new debts (Memoria de Hacien­
da, México 1870: 372-373; Payno y Flores 1862: 220-222, 224).
After the three Diplomatic Conventions had effectively 
shattered  the concept of a single fund for the in ternal debt, 
Congress revised the Law of Public Credit on May 19, 1852. It 
increased the percentage of state  contributions to the federal 
government (contingente) to 20 percent and assigned the in ­
crease and three percent of the new customs duties to the 
creditors of the in ternal debt.14
13 Payno y Flores (1862: 143-149). The creditors involved included José Antonio Béi- 
stegui, Benito M aqua, and Muriel Herm anos who held 1,351,115 pesos (44 percent) 
of the  tobacco bonds.
14 Memoria de Hacienda, México (1870: 376). Another reason the  government could 
challenge the  Law of Public Credit was th a t it discovered th a t the  agiotistas were 
not willing to participate in  it. See Ju n ta  de Crédito Público, México (1852).
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Mexico never m anaged to repay its in ternal debt and as a re­
sult some moneylenders who had speculated foolishly went 
bankrupt. But historians should in terp ret this development in 
the context of a Mexico slowly evolving from colony to indepen­
dent nation. The Treasury borrowed the am ounts it did because 
the w ealthy refused to pay their fair share of the tax  burden. 
Therefore, the government had to get the funds it needed by 
having recourse to other mechanisms, in this case by borrowing 
internally. In conclusion, then, it would be well to consider 
Francisco Lombardo's insistence on the virtues of agiotage. The 
Mexican money m arket provided essential cash and services to 
a newly-established Republic which desperately needed both 
and as yet had no banks. Undoubtedly fraud and corruption 
were part of the costs of doing business in such unstable cir­
cumstances, bu t they should not blind historians to the despair 
which T reasury M inisters like Lombardo faced day after day. If 
Mexican governments could have borrowed funds a t better 
term s, they probably would have, regardless of personal con­
nections.
Seen in this light, the Treasury's m anipulation of the in ter­
nal debt seems, in retrospect, a highly intelligent scheme de­
signed to induce lenders to supply ever greater am ounts of rev­
enue. As such, it worked brilliantly. Mexico, although consider­
ably sm aller in 1855 than  in 1821, m aintained its independence 
and sovereignty through invasions and periods of instability 
which m ight have doomed a lesser nation. Consequently, per­
haps it owes a greater debt than  appendices can express to its 
"financieros sin dinero."
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Appendix A: The In ternal Debt of Mexico in 1831 (in Pesos)
Various credits on Real Hacienda 329,507
Pensions for heirs of Moctezuma, Cortés 652,354
Consulado loan in 1782 756,334
Consulado loan in  1793 1,058,333
Consulado loans 1794, 1806, 1807, 1809 1,058,362
C apital taken  from Consulado 1795 3,063,622
C apital taken  from Mining Fund 3,646,882
Capital taken  from Jesu it properties 322,350
Capital taken  from California missions 201,856
Capital from capellanías, obras pías 9,974,121
Patriotic loan of 20,000,000 pesos 1,500,477
Consulado loan 1811 768,004
Loan in 1812 1,849,941
Silver depósitos a t the M int 1812 58,264
Forced loan 1812 443,102
Consulado loan 1813 1,019,051
Indian parcialidades, Puebla 35,102
Funds from cofradías 66,953
Patriotic loan 1809 7,000
Consulado de Veracruz 2,144,552
Total 28,956,167
Source: Payno (1866: 12-13).
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Appendix B: Composition of Mexico City Money M arket by N ationality
Mexican English/Irish
Agüero, González y Cia. Eustace Barron
Miguel Bringas Geaves and Company
Javier Echeverría Ewen C. MacKintosh
Manuel Escandón Montgomery, Nicod, and Co.
Antonio G aray Jam es P. Penny and Co.
Francisco Iturbe Thomas Worrall
Manuel Lizardi
Ignacio Loperena
Ju an  Rondero
José Joaquín de Rosas
F rench/Swiss/German Spanish
Guillermo D rusina José Antonio y Nicanor Béistegui
C. A. Formachon Lorenzo C arrera
Serm ent P. Fort Gregorio Mier y Terán
G arruste y Cia. Muriel Hermanos
Hube y Cia. Francisco, Tomás y Ju a n  P.
Ju an  B. Jecker M urphy [Morphi]
Cayetano y Francisco Rubio
Isidoro de la Torre
Antonio y Anselmo Zurutuza
Other
Felipe Neri del Barrio (Guatemala)
William Forbes (USA)
Benito M aqua (Cuba)
M artínez del Río Herm anos (Panama)
Hermengildo Viya (Cuba)
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Appendix C: Estím ate of Mexican In ternal Debt, 1848 
(in Pesos)
Debt prior to independence
Old Paper, juros 34,650,000
M ining Fund 4,917,184
Road tolls from Perote, Veracruz 4,956,695
Total 44,524,879
Debt after independence
"Twenty-six percent Fund" 16,874,586
Copper bonds 2,533,205
Floating debt, indemnizations 3,500,000
Civil servants, m ilitary 25,000,000
Total 47,907,791
Total In ternal Debt 92,432,670
Source: Payno (1866: 15).
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Appendix D: Categories of Mexican Internal Debt in 1850
1. Indem nization of English subjects a t 2 % (F)
2. Montgomery, Nicod and Company (F/S)
3. Philippine missions (S)
4. Conducta confiscation (S)
5. Tobacco harvesters (S)
6. Bondholders from the old copper coins (S)
7. "The Twenty-Six Percent Fund" (S)
8. Tobacco Bonds (F/S)
9. Mining Fund (S)
10. Tolls from Veracruz Consulado and avería (E)
11. Tolls from Mexico City Consulado (E)
12. Civilian Government Employees (S?)
13. Debt prior to independence (S)
14. Property confiscation (S)
15. Cash Only Loans (S)
16. Loans w ith credits (S)
17. Property contracts (S)
Abbreviations: S = Speculator; E = Elite; F = Foreign 
(Speculator?).
Source'. Documentos, México (1851: 66-67).
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Appendix E: Im m ediate Paym ent to Be Made on In ternal Debt 
as a Result of the Law of Public Credit, 1851 (in Pesos)
The 20 % Fund 530,000 S
V oluntary loans made in cash 381,235 S
Property damages 300,000
Forced occupation during W ar w ith US 600,000
Iturbide's silver tra in  confiscation 200,000
Floating debt w ith credits 300,000 S
"Two Percent" and "One Percent" Funds 137,667 S
"Five Percent" Fund 454,000 S
Padre M orán Convention 300,000 S
Silver bars confiscated in San Luis Potosí 104,209
H eirs of Em peror Moctezuma 128,713
Tobacco harvesters 320,000 S
Debt represented by M artinez del Rio, 
herm anos 1,750,000 s
Serm ent P. Fort and Company 300,000 s
Debt of Carm elite fathers rep. by MacKintosh 176,045 s
Luis Vial 13,000 s
Total which the Law of Public Credit would
have had to pay 5,994,869
Abbreviation : S = Speculator. 
Source: Esteva (1851: 25-27).
